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 Honorable Noel L. Hillman, United States District Judge for the District of New*
Jersey, sitting by designation.
                                                                                           NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                   
No. 09-3414
__________
DAVID MCDERMOTT
v.
GMAC MORTGAGE GROUP, LLC 
COMPREHENSIVE WELFARE BENEFITS PLAN,
                                             Appellant.
                                                         
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-08-cv-05299)
District Judge:  Hon. Legrome D. Davis
                                                               
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
 on May 10, 2010
                                                
Before:  BARRY and ROTH, Circuit Judges and HILLMAN,  District Judge*
(Opinion filed: August 6, 2010)
                    
O P I N I O N
                    
HILLMAN, District Judge:
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GMAC Mortgage Group, LLC Comprehensive Welfare Benefits Plan (“the Plan”)
appeals the granting of David McDermott’s (“McDermott”) motion for summary
judgment.  The District Court determined that McDermott was entitled to supplemental
long-term disability benefits under the Plan, and denied the Plan’s cross-motion for
summary judgment.  The District Court had jurisdiction to consider the parties’ motions
under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(e)(1) and (f), as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We will affirm.
I.  Background
On January 15, 2007, McDermott applied for supplemental long-term disability
coverage (“the Policy”), which was one component of the Plan offered by his employer,
GMAC Residential Capital Corporation, LLC (“GMAC”), and administered by
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”).  The effective date of the Policy was
April 1, 2007.  Shortly after applying for the Policy, McDermott took a medical leave of
absence from January 19, 2007 until April 16, 2007.  He then returned to work on April
17, 2007 for three months, until going out indefinitely as a result of illness again on July
17, 2007.  After complying with the requisite waiting period and paying his premiums,
McDermott applied for benefits under the Policy.  His application was denied by MetLife
in December 2007, on the grounds that he was not “actively at work” as of the effective
date of the Policy.  McDermott’s appeals of this decision were also denied and the instant
litigation followed.
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The District Court found that the Plan did not contain language sufficient to confer
discretionary authority on MetLife and, accordingly, that a deferential standard of review
of its denial of benefits was not appropriate.  Applying a de novo standard of review, the
District Court considered two different provisions cited by the parties.  
First, the District Court considered the Short-Form Application for Individual
Disability Income Insurance (“the Application”), cited by the Plan, which provides:
MetLife will have no liability unless the Proposed Insured is
working 30 hours per week at the regular place of business of
the employer named in this application as of the effective date
of the policy, or is in school on a full-time basis if a student.
(App. at 44 (emphasis added).)  If this provision controlled, McDermott would have been
properly denied benefits since he was on leave on April 1, 2007, the effective date of the
Policy.
Second, the District Court considered the Summary Plan Description (“SPD”),
cited by McDermott, which provides:
When Does Coverage Begin?
If you are a new hire, your coverage for a particular benefit
begins on the date specified in Schedule A for that benefit and
remains in effect through December 31 of the calendar year in
which you first become eligible.  Please note that you must be
Actively-at-Work as an eligible associate (see “Eligibility”
section page 6) in order for your benefit to become effective.  If
you are not actively at work as an eligible associate when your
benefits would otherwise become effective, these benefits will
become effective on the date of your return to “Active Work” as
an eligible associate. “Actively-at-Work” or “Active Work”
means that you are performing all the material duties of your job
 “The doctrine that, in interpreting documents, ambiguities are to be construed1
unfavorably to the drafter.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 377 (9  ed. 2009).th
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with the Employer where these duties are normally carried out.
If you were Actively-at-Work on your last scheduled working
day, you will be deemed Actively-at-Work while on a paid
vacation or on a scheduled non-working day, provided you are
not disabled.
(Id. at 21 (emphasis added).)  In contrast to the Application, if this provision applied to
McDermott, by its terms the Policy became effective on April 17, 2007, the date he
returned from his leave. 
The District Court concluded that the SPD was susceptible to two possible
meanings, as it could be read to apply to all employees (McDermott’s position) or to new
hires only (the Plan’s position).  Applying the doctrine of contra proferentem,   the1
District Court held that it must interpret the SPD in the manner most favorable to
McDermott, that when so interpreted the SPD conflicts with the Application, and that the
SPD must control when such a conflict exists.  The District Court thus held that the
effective date of the Policy was April 17, 2007, the date McDermott returned to active
work, and MetLife erred in finding McDermott ineligible for benefits because he was not
at work on April 1, 2007.  
The Plan argues that the District Court erred in applying a de novo standard of
review, and that MetLife’s determination should have been reviewed under an arbitrary
and capricious standard because it was granted discretionary authority under the Plan. 
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Further, the Plan argues that the District Court erred in finding that a conflict existed
between the SPD and the Application.  Instead, it argues, the SPD clearly and
unambiguously related to new hires, MetLife’s interpretation of the SPD was correct and
at the very least reasonable, and even if a conflict existed the Application should have
governed. 
II.  Discussion
This Court exercises plenary review over an appeal from a grant of summary
judgment.  Jacobs Constructors, Inc. v. NPS Energy Servs., Inc., 264 F.3d 365, 369 (3d
Cir. 2001).  Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)).  “In making this determination, we must consider the evidence in the record in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Id.  
It is well established that a court must apply a de novo standard of review to
adverse benefits determinations “unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or
fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the
terms of the plan,” in which case an arbitrary and capricious standard of review is
applied.  Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).  In
determining the appropriate standard of review, a court must accordingly start with the
terms of the plan.  Id. at 111.  A plan’s grant of discretion can be either express or
implied, although a general grant of administrative power does not imply authority to
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determine specific benefits eligibility disputes.  Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare &
Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1180 (3d Cir. 1991).  Any ambiguity in the plan
must also be construed in favor of the insured.  Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d
1249, 1258 (3d Cir. 1993).
The Plan argues that the SPD contains several provisions that when read together
with the Application grant MetLife discretionary authority.  Specifically, the Plan refers
to the following three provisions of the SPD:
• [T]he Employer reserves the exclusive right, power and
authority, in its sole and absolute discretion, to administer,
apply and interpret the benefits plans described herein, and to
decide all matter arising in connection with the operation
and/or administration of such plans except for matters
reserved to an insurance carrier under its policy issued in
connection with this Plan or matters under the control of an
independent claims fiduciary.  (App. at 33.)
• The Employer designs eligibility conditions and benefits that
will be provided under the policy . . . , the insurance company
administers the policy.  (Id. at 19.)
• To make a claim for benefits provided under the Plan, you
should obtain a claim form from the insurance carrier or
administrator providing the benefit.  The form should be sent
to the insurance carrier or administrator who makes the
determination with respect to whether you are eligible to
receive benefits. 
If your claim for benefits is denied for any reason, you have
the right to appeal the denial directly with the insurance
carrier or administrator providing the benefit.
You may consult the applicable benefit booklet or contact the
carrier or administrator for a complete description of the
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claim procedure and the claim appeals procedures.
The Employer does not have the authority to consider any
claim made to an insurance carrier or decision the insurance
carrier reaches.  (Id. at 28.)
The Plan also refers to the following two provisions of the Application:
• Written proof of loss satisfactory to [MetLife] must be sent to us
within 90 days after the end of each monthly period for which
You claim benefits.  (Id. at 53.)
• At [MetLife’s] expense, as often as is reasonably necessary, We
may require You to have an independent examination by a
Physician of Our choice.  (Id.)
We disagree that these provisions grant MetLife discretionary authority.  Rather,
these provisions are at most a grant of decision-making authority to MetLife, and not a
grant of discretionary authority in making those decisions.  See Ingram v. Martin Marietta
Long Term Disability Income Plan for Salaried Employees of Transferred GE
Operations, 244 F.3d 1109, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (“An allocation of decision-making
authority to MetLife is not, without more, a grant of discretionary authority in making
those decisions.”); Cathey v. Dow Chem. Co. Med. Care Program, 907 F.2d 544, 559 (5th
Cir. 1990) (distinguishing between allocation of authority to review claims and
discretionary authority).  
Although the SPD clearly reserved discretionary authority for the Employer,
GMAC did not make any of the decisions at issue in this case and there was no such
reservation of discretionary authority for MetLife.  In the absence of any express or
 Having held that a de novo standard of review applies, we need not consider2
either the Plan’s arguments regarding the application of an arbitrary and capricious
standard, or McDermott’s arguments regarding the untimeliness of MetLife’s
determination of his appeal.
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implied grant of discretionary authority to MetLife, we must apply a de novo standard in
reviewing MetLife’s denial of McDermott’s benefits.2
The District Court carefully parsed the language of the SPD provisions and noted
that while they vest discretionary authority in the employer, they created “a cut-out in that
authority so that the employer’s authority does not extend to ‘matters reserved to an
insurance carrier under its policy issued in connection with this Plan.’”  (App. at 5.)  The
District Court also noted that the SPD “vest[ed] no authority, let alone discretionary
authority, in insurance carriers like MetLife.”  (Id.)  If GMAC intended to give MetLife
discretionary authority to interpret the language of the Plan it could have easily done so. 
Having failed to do so, the District Court was correct to apply a de novo standard of
review.
The Plan also argues that no conflict exists between the SPD and the Application,
because the SPD only applies to new hires.  Further, even if a conflict were to exist, the
Plan argues, the SPD expressly integrates the Policy and the Plan, and provides that the
Plan governs in the event of any conflict.  We disagree.  The language of the SPD, which
is set forth above, can reasonably be interpreted as applying to all employees or to just
new employees.  Faced with such ambiguity, the District Court was required, as we are, to
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construe the SPD in favor of McDermott.  Heasley, 2 F.3d at 1258.  So construed, we find
that the SPD provides for an effective date of April 17, 2007, the day McDermott
returned to active work, for the Policy.  This effective date governs regardless of any
conflicting language that may exist in the Application, the Policy, or the Plan, as it is well
established that a summary plan description governs when any conflict exists with the
plan language.  Burnstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ.
& Research, 334 F.3d 365, 379 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that terms of summary plan
description governed over conflicting plan language even where it provided that the plan
would govern in the event of any differences between the documents).  We therefore
conclude that MetLife erred when it found McDermott ineligible for benefits under the
Policy.
III.  Conclusion
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting summary judgment
in favor of McDermott.
